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a  b  s  t r  a  c  t
Prior  research  on  the  labor  market  success  of  secondary  vocational  education  has  produced
mixed  results,  with  several  studies  finding  wage  gains  only  for  individuals  who  work  in
training-related  occupations.  We  contribute  to  this  debate  by  focusing  on  a single  occu-
pation  and  organization  and  by comparing  the  careers  of employees  with  and without
occupation-related  training  in  high  school.  We  use  longitudinal  data  on the  careers  of  mil-
itary  recruits  who  completed  high  school  Junior  Reserve  Officers’  Training  Corps  (JROTC),
a military  science  program  that  has features  of  a  vocational  training  and  school-to-work
program.  We  find  that  the occupation-specific  training  received  via  JROTC  reduces  early





ing that  an important  effect  of vocational  training  is to  improve  job  match  quality.  We also
find that  promotion  rates  for  vocational  graduates  are  similar  to their  peers,  suggesting  that
vocational  education  in  general  works  by  improving  occupational  sorting.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.Internal labor markets
1. Introduction
The role of vocational education in the high school
curriculum has long been a controversial topic in educa-
tion reform debates (Levesque, Lauen, Teitelbaum, Alt, &
Librera, 2000; U.S. Department of Education, 2004). The
controversy is fueled in part by mixed results on the labor
market effects of vocational education (for a survey see
Bishop & Mane, 2004). Some studies report positive wage
effects when vocational graduates work in training-related
jobs (Neuman & Ziderman, 1991, 1999). Since only 43% of
vocational graduates work in occupations that match their
training (Bishop, 1989), this finding raises questions about
the effectiveness of vocational education. Hotchkiss (1993)
finds no short-run wage gains, regardless of whether voca-
tional education matches future occupations. Meer (2007)
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0272-7757/$ – see front matter. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.04.005finds that long-run wage gains for vocational graduates
are due to students’ self-selection into tracks (vocational
or academic). These findings have divergent policy impli-
cations and highlight the need for a better understanding
of the pathways via which secondary vocational education
affects labor market success.
Our study analyzes the impact of vocational education
using data for employees in one occupational category.
Examining within-occupation outcomes avoids confound-
ing the effects of vocational training with occupational
self-selection. In addition, rather than focusing on wages
as in prior studies, we examine early turnover, long-run
job attachment, and productivity. This allows us to pin-
point the channels through which vocational education
contributes to job market success. For example, vocational
education may  directly enhance job skills within an occu-
pation, thus increasing worker productivity (human capital
effect). Alternatively, vocational education may  improve
ex ante information about specific jobs, professions, and
























































The curriculum includes core subjects such as citizenship,
communications, geography, health, and physical fitness.
Each high school’s JROTC program is affiliated with one of
the military branches and uses retired military personnel
2 For an analysis of STW programs, see, e.g., Neumark and RothsteinE. Pema, S. Mehay / Economics o
atch effect). Wage gains could result in either case, but for
olicy purposes, it is important to know whether vocational
ducation increases wages by enhancing productivity, or
y increasing the job-market attachment. We  investigate
hat drives the estimated wage gains in the vocational
iterature, after holding constant occupational selection,
rm-specific training, and across-firm variation. Our find-
ngs also shed light on why the documented wage effects
re more pronounced in the long run and for those work-
ng in occupations that match most closely their vocational
raining.
We  focus on a high school military science program,
unior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC), which
s similar to other vocational education programs in its
cope and curriculum. However, unlike other vocational
rograms whose graduates enter different firms and occu-
ations, JROTC prepares students for careers in the military.
xploiting this link, we use data on U.S. Navy recruits and
bserve the performance of JROTC graduates in their mil-
tary careers. We  analyze vocational training effects by
omparing the performance of new ‘hires’ with and with-
ut JROTC training.
Military data are well suited for this analysis, since the
ilitary represents both an employer and a broad occupa-
ional ‘cluster’ (Levesque, Laird, Hensley, Choy, & Cataldi,
008). The military’s rigid personnel system holds constant
actors that confound the estimated effects of vocational
ducation when using public data, such as differences in the
mount of firm-specific training or placement of employ-
es in different or fast tracks. Most importantly, the military
ata allow us to examine the direct effect of vocational
raining on both job performance and on job attachment.
Another problem we can sidestep with these
ata is the definition of ‘occupation’ and identifying
occupation–training matches.’ Vocational programs feed
nto many different occupations and prior studies vary in
heir definitions of occupational categories.1 Furthermore,
he way occupational controls, broad or narrow, are fac-
ored in the estimations varies greatly, complicating the
omparison of effects across studies. Including occupation
ontrols may  lead to an overestimation of vocational
raining effects if individuals self-select into various
ccupations based on their comparative advantage. While
djusting for occupational self-selection can yield causal
ffects, it leaves open the possibility that vocational train-
ng works precisely by improving such sorting, rather than
y improving occupation-specific skills. Given our large
ample of individuals working in the same occupation, we
an avoid bias both from occupational self-selection and
rom across-occupation wage variance.
While the JROTC–military relationship is unique in that
raining is linked to one employer, the analysis provides
nsights that generalize across vocational programs and
mployers. JROTC mimics typical vocational training in
ts goals, curriculum, and target population. For example,
1 In general, the vocational education literature defines ‘occupation’
ery broadly. Neuman and Ziderman (1999) identify eight occupational
ategories for vocational education, whereas Hotchkiss (1993) identifies
nly two.ion Review 31 (2012) 680– 693 681
JROTC enrollees typically are non-college-bound students
interested in learning about a potential occupation. JROTC
offers elective courses that impart skills used in the mil-
itary. Similar to school-to-work programs (STW), JROTC
conveys information about the profession by both simulat-
ing military life and by providing instruction from former
military personnel.2
Although not a profit-maximizing firm, the US mili-
tary is a cost-minimizing organization that competes for
recruits by designing contracts that attract individuals with
the requisite skills. Labor economists traditionally have
analyzed military enlistment as an occupational choice
with recruits weighing the benefits and costs of enlist-
ing relative to civilian employment opportunities (see,
e.g., Asch & Hosek, 2007; Warner & Asch, 2001). To be
competitive in the youth labor market, the military must
tailor compensation packages to attract and retain the
required quantity and quality of personnel (Hosek & Sharp,
2001). Similar to private firms, the military offers firm-
specific training, and the return to that training depends
on the expected employment duration of training recip-
ients. Due to the absence of lateral entry, the military
seeks new recruits who stay in service sufficiently long
to allow recoupment of training costs. These constraints
force the military to define job match the same as pri-
vate firms – in terms of low turnover (Jovanovic, 1979).
While it may  appear that the military can obligate recruits
to binding contracts until the costs of recruiting and train-
ing are recovered, in reality the military does not gain from
employing or retaining individuals who are poor matches.
Therefore, about 30% of new recruits leave the military
without completing their service obligations and with-
out any repercussions. Thus, the military aims to improve
the quality of match at entry, allows those who  are mis-
matched to leave, and incentivizes continued employment
via reenlistment bonuses, similar to other firms that use
compensation packages to hire and retain employees.
2. Background
JROTC enrolls over 500,000 students in more than 3300
high schools (20% of all public high schools).3 As in voca-
tional and STW programs, JROTC offers both academic and
vocational courses and is linked to a specific employer.4(2006).
3 For information on JROTC see Coumbe, Kotakis, and Gammell (2008)
and Laurence and Estrada (2003).
4 STW programs include school-based learning, work-based learning,
and  connecting activities. School-based learning includes academic and
vocational courses; work-based learning includes hands-on job train-
ing, mentoring, and instruction in a workplace (via internships and
apprenticeships). STW connection activities establish partnerships with
employers to ease the school-to-work transition (Neumark, 2009). JROTC
is  comparable to STW activities such as job shadowing, mentoring, and
internships.
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from that branch as instructors.5 In addition to general mil-
itary courses – such as military history, national security
issues, and leadership – each program offers branch-
specific courses. For example, the Army JROTC curriculum
includes geography, earth sciences, and orienteering; the
Air Force curriculum includes aerospace and aerodynam-
ics; and core classes in the Navy curriculum are naval
science (including sea navigation, rules of the road, and
shipboard life), oceanography, meteorology, and Navy tac-
tics and strategy.6
Although it is similar to vocational education and
STW programs, JROTC has been overlooked by education
researchers. This oversight may  stem from the percep-
tion that military science classes represent extracurricular
activities that do not affect employment, a perception fos-
tered by the U.S. Department of Education’s classification of
high school military science classes as ‘enrichment/other’
rather than vocational education (Levesque et al., 2000).
This designation contradicts the Department of Education’s
own definition of career technical education as classes
that teach “. . . skills required in specific occupations or
occupational clusters” (Levesque et al., 2008, p. 3).7 More
important, this classification misrepresents the scope and
content of JROTC.8 The curriculum, the use of military
instructors, and the close link with the employer are clear
indicators of the program’s vocational orientation.9 Mil-
itary science ‘concentrators’ (students with at least 3.0
Carnegie credits) receive an advanced pay grade if they
enlist. About 40% of such concentrators enter the military
(Taylor, 1999), which is similar to the 43% of vocational stu-
dents who find jobs in training-related civilian occupations
(Bishop, 1989).
Prior research on JROTC is limited. Elliott, Hanser,
and Gilroy (2002) analyze a federal pilot program that
combined career academies with JROTC.10 They find that
JROTC Partnership Academy students had better academic
5 Instructors are hired by local school districts who share instructor
salaries with Department of Defense.
6 The JROTC curriculum covers 180 h per year, or 1.0 Carnegie unit. Gen-
erally, 130 h are devoted to core subjects, while 50 h are taken in elective
courses (Coumbe et al., 2008).
7 The Department of Education (1987) labels military employment as
a  ‘non-labor market activity,’ which contradicts how economists analyze
military manpower supply issues. In an all-volunteer military, employ-
ment in the military is a voluntary occupational choice made by youth who
weigh the monetary and non-pecuniary attributes of available jobs. Like
other employers, the military sets minimum standards for entry and must
offer compensation packages sufficient to attract and retain the required
quantity and quality of personnel (Asch & Hosek, 2007; Warner & Asch,
2001).
8 Another inconsistency is that for secondary schools DoE defines an
occupational category called ‘protective services,’ which omits military
science classes, whereas for colleges the same ‘protective services’ voca-
tional category includes military science classes (Levesque et al., 2008).
9 Military pay is competitive for non-college-bound youth. The earnings
of  new recruits exceed the median earnings of comparable non-college
high school graduates. In 2009 enlistees entering in grades E1–E3
earned the equivalent of $34,752–$37,803 in taxable earnings, exclud-
ing benefits (retrieved January 11, 2009 from www.defenselink.mil/
militarypay/mpcales/calculator/RMC.aspx) as compared to median civil-
ian earnings of $25,012 for a 20–24-year-old male (retrieved January 11,
2009 from www.bls.gov).
10 The ‘Federal–Local Partnership for Serving At-Risk Youth Program’
was  jointly sponsored by the Departments of Education and Defense andion Review 31 (2012) 680– 693
achievement than students in a general track or ‘regular’
JROTC students. Pema and Mehay (2009, 2010) investigate
several in-school and post-school outcomes of JROTC. They
find that JROTC students are far more likely to enlist than
their peers. They also find no employment effects for JROTC
students who  do not enlist, suggesting that program effects
may  be confined to those who  choose a training-related
occupation.
Other relevant studies include those that investigate
career interests and ex ante labor market knowledge.
Neumann, Olitsky, and Robbins (2009) examine the wage
effects of job ‘congruence’ and find positive effects when
college graduates’ career interests and values are congru-
ent with their occupational work environment. Job match
quality is based on the degree to which individuals’ inter-
ests match their occupation’s characteristics. Polachek and
Robst (1998) find higher wages for workers with higher
scores on the ‘Knowledge of the World of Work’ test, which
measures the degree of occupational information. These
studies suggest that STW and vocational programs work in
part by aligning students’ interests and by providing ex ante
labor market information, which improves occupational
sorting and job match quality.
3. Data
We use data on all recruits who entered the Navy
between 1994 and 2001. We  restrict the sample to those
with four-year contracts and we  track each new recruit
for 5 years or until separation. The Defense Manpower
Data Center provided the personnel data, which contained
367,241 observations. We  delete those with prior military
service to maintain homogeneity of initial skill training
and career paths, leaving 325,560 observations. Recruits
are identified as JROTC completers if they earned at least
3.0 Carnegie units in military science (the equivalent of
an ‘occupational concentrator’) (Levesque et al., 2000;
Levesque, 2003a, 2003b).
To determine whether vocational education works by
increasing human capital or by improving sorting, we
analyze alternate measures of career progression and job
match quality. First, we investigate two measures of job
match quality: (a) early turnover during the recruit’s 4-year
contract; and (b) voluntary reenlistment decisions at the
end of the 4-year contract. Early turnover (called ‘attrition’
in military parlance) reflects job mismatch. All mismatches
result in an individual being discharged regardless of
whether the dissatisfaction originates with the individual
or with the organization.11Second, to assess long-term job stability we analyze
reenlistment decisions. Early turnover and reenlistment
are indicators of job match quality and job stability,
attempted to combine the strengths of JROTC with the career academy
focus on work-based learning (Hanser & Robyn, 2000).
11 Supervisors may  discharge recruits for poor performance or behav-
ioral problems, or recruits may  provoke discharges by deliberately
performing poorly or displaying behavioral problems. Klein et al. (1991)
show that official separation codes seldom identify the true reason for a
mismatch and Buddin (1984) points out conceptual difficulties in distin-
guishing military ‘quits’ from ‘fires.’


































































Native American 0.017 0.027
(0.128) (0.162)
Other race 0.009 0.009
(0.093) (0.093)
Married, children 0.038 0.048
(0.191) (0.215)
Married, no children 0.002 0.001
(0.040) (0.035)
Education and ability
No high school diploma 0.028 0.037
(0.164) (0.189)
Certificate or GED 0.045 0.072
(0.208) (0.259)
High school diploma 0.902 0.842
(0.297) (0.365)
Some college 0.018 0.031
(0.132) (0.173)
College degree 0.007 0.018
(0.084) (0.132)
AFQT percentile 57.582 60.768
(18.318) (18.794)
Outcomes
12-Month turnover 0.172 0.210
(0.377) (0.407)
24-Month turnover 0.247 0.285
(0.431) (0.452)
36-Month turnover 0.312 0.342
(0.463) (0.474)




Promote to E4 0.828 0.886
(0.377) (0.318)
Promote to E5 0.198 0.268
(0.398) (0.443)E. Pema, S. Mehay / Economics o
espectively, which are problematic in youth labor mar-
ets (Yates, 2005). Neumark (2002) shows that unstable
arly job experiences of youth have lasting adverse effects
n adult labor market outcomes.
Third, to investigate the human capital effect of voca-
ional training, we analyze promotion outcomes. Most
ew recruits enter in grade E1, but some enter in higher
rades if they have completed some college courses or a
ROTC program. Those who enter in grade E1 normally
dvance rapidly to E3, since these steps are administra-
ively awarded. In contrast, promotions to grades E4 and
5 are competitive and depend on demonstrated per-
ormance, supervisors’ evaluations, and skill qualification
xams (Williamson, 1999).12 We  use promotion to E4 and
5 as measures of job performance. It should be noted that,
ue to administrative wage setting, wages in the military
re not connected to productivity except through promo-
ions. Compared to promotions, however, military wages
ntroduce more noise because they also depend on the local
ost of living, number of dependents, and other similar
dministrative rules, which are not related to performance.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Women  and
frican Americans are disproportionately represented
mong JROTC recruits compared to other recruits. JROTC
ecruits have slightly lower AFQT scores (by 3 points), but
his difference is explained largely by the racial compo-
ition of JROTC participants; controlling for race reduces
he AFQT score gap to only 1.2 points. About 90% of JROTC
ecruits possess only a high school diploma, whereas the
ducational attainment of other recruits is more dispersed.
his suggests that JROTC participation does not help high
chool dropouts enlist. It also suggests that JROTC partici-
ants tend to enter the military directly after high school
ithout first exploring college opportunities. In terms of
areer outcomes, JROTC recruits have, on average, lower
urnover, higher reenlistment rates, and lower promotion
ates than other recruits.
. Estimating the effect of JROTC on careers
We first propose the following model for estimating the
ffects of vocational education on turnover, reenlistment,
nd promotion:
yi = 1(ı  JROTCi + ˇ1Xi + ˇ2Ai + ˇ3Mi + ui > 0),
i = 1, . . . , N (1)
where yi denotes the outcomes (turnover, reenlistment,
romotion) for individual i, Xi includes demographics
race/ethnicity, gender, marital status, dependents, and
n interaction of the last two variables), and Mi repre-
ents institution-specific variables, including eight cohort
ummies and ten dummies for military specialty. After
eceiving initial (basic) training, most new recruits receive
pecialty training. Controlling for military specialty isolates
12 The personnel system consists of nine grades, E1–E9: Grades E1–E3
epresent trainee and apprentice positions; grades E4–E6 represent tech-
ician and work group manager/leader positions; and grades E7–E9
epresent supervisory positions.Observations 9347 316,213
Notes: The sample includes Navy recruits who enlist during 1994–2001
with 4-year contracts. It excludes prior enlisted recruits.
the effect of vocational education from the effect of firm-
sponsored training. The cohort dummies proxy for civilian
labor market conditions and other unmeasured differences
across cohorts (due, for example, to fluctuations in recruit-
ing policies). Ai includes ability proxies based on AFQT
scores and educational attainment.13
13 Rodgers and Spriggs (2002) suggest that AFQT scores are not good
proxies for ability because they depend on age and education, and that
AFQT scores should be adjusted before introducing them in wage regres-
sions. We do not adjust AFQT scores for age and education because in
our sample, compared to most public datasets, the screening of military
f Educat684 E. Pema, S. Mehay / Economics o
We  initially estimate Eq. (1) via probit, which assumes
that ui does not include unobservables correlated with pro-
gram participation and outcomes. However, this approach
ignores the possibility that JROTC participation is endoge-
nous. For example, if individuals who participate in JROTC
have a stronger taste for the military, they would be more
likely to fulfill their contracts or to reenlist.14 On the other
hand, the correlation could be negative if JROTC attracts
disadvantaged students (for evidence see Pema & Mehay,
2009). If JROTC recruits are negatively selected (compared
to both other high school students and to other recruits),
our baseline estimates may  be negatively biased.15 We
offer two alternative methods to address the self-selection
problem.
Our first way of dealing with selection bias treats pro-
gram participation as endogenous. For recruit i living in
area j we specify a bivariate probit model:
yij = 1
(
ı JROTCij + 1Xi + 2Ai + 3Mi + 4Lj + uij > 0
)
,
i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , J (2)
















We create an instrument by matching recruits’ home
addresses (zip code) with the addresses of high schools
located in the same zip code that offered JROTC.16 We
instrument program participation with an indicator –
ZIPJROTCj – for whether a high school in the recruit’s
home zip code offered JROTC. Eq. (3) assumes that program
participation is a function of individual characteristics
and ability (Xi, Ai), the presence of a school that offers
JROTC in the zip code (ZIPJROTCj), and local area char-
acteristics (Lj). Identification requires that the excluded
variable, ZIPJROTCj, predicts JROTC participation, but is not
correlated with unobserved factors associated with job per-
formance yij.
The first assumption for identification appears to be
met  since Pema and Mehay (2010) show that over 80% of
high school students who complete JROTC do so if their
school offers the program.17 Also, in regressions of Eq.
(3), described below, ZIPJROTCj always has a statistically
applicants reduces heterogeneity along these dimensions. In addition, we
are holding education and many other variables fixed.
14 Pema and Mehay (2009) show JROTC participants have stronger pref-
erences for military careers than other high school students. In contrast,
our sample includes only enlistees, which reduces the problem of taste
selection. However, if JROTC recruits have relatively stronger tastes for
the military than other recruits, job attachment estimates still may  be
biased upward.
15 Any negative selection into the program in high school is likely
reduced by the screening of military applicants based on educational
attainment and aptitude.
16 Zip codes for each recruit’s home address were provided in the per-
sonnel files. Zip codes for each JROTC high school were obtained from each
service’s cadet command.
17 Some students take JROTC classes in nearby schools when classes are
not available in their own  school.ion Review 31 (2012) 680– 693
significant coefficient. The second condition for a valid
instrument is that E[yij|JROTCij, Xi, Ai, Mi, Lj] should not
depend on whether schools in a recruit’s home zip code
offered JROTC. Ideally, if schools randomly offered the pro-
gram, ZIPJROTCj would not affect career outcomes other
than via individual participation. Therefore, in the absence
of school-level selection into JROTC, this model would ade-
quately address individual self-selection. However, Pema
and Mehay (2010) find that JROTC programs are often
located in inner cities and areas with high recruiting poten-
tial. Consequently, program location may  be correlated
with other unobserved characteristics of the recruit and
the area, both of which may  affect career outcomes.
To deal with this problem, Eq. (3) explicitly controls for
socioeconomic attributes of the recruit’s community (Lj).
These variables include county-level unemployment rates
and per capita earnings for each year from 1990 to 2007.
These variables capture local economic conditions from the
time recruits are in high school through the end of their first
term of service (when they make reenlistment decisions).
From the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, we  also obtain other
county-level characteristics, including the population in
the armed forces and in poverty, and the percent of the pop-
ulation that is black, Hispanic, or American Indian. Since
placement of JROTC units tends to focus on poorer areas
and those with high recruiting potential, we expect that
total, rather than percent, military and poverty population
are better controls for local area characteristics correlated
with the presence of a JROTC unit. Inclusion of the county-
level variables allows the effect of our IV to emerge only via
individual participation in JROTC. These county-level vari-
ables proxy for local socioeconomic conditions that affect
a school’s ability to qualify for JROTC and that also may
be correlated with job match quality and military perfor-
mance.
If there are other unobservable local area features that
are correlated with JROTC participation and military per-
formance, our bivariate probit results would be biased.
For example, if areas with JROTC high schools also offer
fewer employment opportunities, JROTC recruits may  be
more likely to stay in the military. Controlling for local
unemployment, earnings, and poverty addresses this issue,
but there still may  be other unobservable local conditions
that affect both program participation and job attach-
ment. In addition, while the previous analysis controls for
county-level factors that may reflect local labor market
conditions, it may fail to capture fully the characteristics
of the smaller neighborhoods (zip codes) where recruits
resided.
To address these concerns, we also obtain program
effects by comparing JROTC and non-JROTC recruits who
resided in the same zip code. These fixed effects models
net out both observable and unobservable characteristics
at the zip code level that may  be correlated with job out-
comes and the presence of JROTC. If we enhance the original
model to include the unobserved characteristics of the local
area lj we obtain:yij = 1(  JROTCi + 1Xi + 2Ai + 3Mi + 4Lj + lj + eij > 0),
i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , J (5)


















































JROTC effects on turnover and reenlistment.
All Males Females
Panel A. Job match
12-Month turnover −0.132 −0.134 −0.106
(0.016)*** (0.018)*** (0.034)***
[−0.035] [−0.036] [−0.030]
24-Month turnover −0.116 −0.112 −0.101
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.031)***
[−0.038] [−0.036] [−0.033]
36-Month turnover −0.088 −0.081 −0.081
(0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.030)***
[−0.031] [−0.029] [−0.030]
First term turnover −0.094 −0.091 −0.075
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.030)**
[−0.035] [−0.034] [−0.029]
Panel B. Job stability
Reenlistment 0.144 0.140 0.132
(36 month stayers) (0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.037)***
[0.055] [0.053] [0.051]
Notes: All regressions include demographics (age, gender, race, marital
status, and number of children), AFQT scores, education, and cohort dum-
mies. With the exception of 12- and 24-month attrition, the models also
include dummies for military occupation (10 categories). Full results are
presented in Table A1.  The attrition regressions include 325,560 individu-
als  (269,020 males and 56,540 females). The retention regressions include
207,825 individuals (172,484 males and 35,341 females).
Standard errors are in parentheses and marginal effects are in brackets.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.E. Pema, S. Mehay / Economics o
ssuming that eij follows a logistic distribution conditional
n both observable and unobservable variables, Eq. (5)
elow can be estimated via conditional maximum likeli-
ood:
(yij = 1|Xi, Ai, Mi, Lj, JROTCi, lj) = ( JROTCi + 1Xi
+ 2Ai + 3Mi + 4Lj + lj) (6)
his approach provides estimates that are conditional upon
oth observable and unobservable area-specific effects Lj
nd lj.18
. Baseline estimates
Table 2, panel A presents probit estimates of the
urnover and reenlistment models. We  analyze turnover at
2-month intervals over the 4-year term of service. If job
nformation acquired via JROTC improves career decision-
aking, we expect program participation to improve job
atch quality. We  estimate separate program effects by
ender because women experience higher turnover and
ower retention in the military (Buddin, 2005). One poten-
ial explanation for this gender gap is that women have
ower tastes for the military. Hence, by providing a realis-
ic preview of military life, JROTC may  help women assess
otential military careers more than it helps men.
The probit results indicate that JROTC participants have
ower early turnover than other recruits (by 3 percentage
oints). This effect is similar for males and females. The
ample for the reenlistment model in panel B of Table 2
ncludes only recruits who survive the first 36 months of
ervice (turnover averages about 35% during the first 36
onths). JROTC participation appears to increase reenlist-
ent by 5.5 percentage points (9%).19 If individuals who
urvive the first 36 months have stronger tastes for the mil-
tary or represent better job matches, then reenlistment
ffects obtained from the restricted sample of survivors
hould provide a stronger test of the program’s effect on
ob stability.
. Bivariate probit estimates
Table 3 displays the bivariate probit estimates. After
nstrumenting for endogenous program participation,20
e find that program effects on turnover and reenlistment
re larger than in the previous probit estimates. JROTC par-
icipation reduces turnover by 12–17 percentage points
nd improves reenlistment by 8.6 points. Turnover effects
re larger for females than for males, whereas the reenlist-
ent effect is not significant for women. The larger overall
18 This method effectively reduces the sample to recruits who  lived in
ip codes with JROTC schools. Because most zip codes contain only one
ROTC high school (operated by one of the four military branches), fixed
ffects estimates do not depend on branch-specific program variation.
19 Full results are presented in Table A1.
20 About 41,176 recruits in our sample (16%) lived in a zip code that con-
ained a JROTC high school. In the first stage regressions predicting JROTC
articipation, ZIPJROTC has an estimated coefficient of 0.143 (s.e. = 0.039)
hen using the sample for the attrition models, and a coefficient of 0.175
s.e. = 0.043) for the restricted sample of stayers used in the reenlistment
nd promotion models.*** Significant at 1% level.
bivariate probit estimates are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that JROTC recruits are negatively selected and have
unobserved characteristics that make them more likely
to separate early and less likely to reenlist. This conclu-
sion is supported by the estimated correlation between the
error terms of the participation and outcome equations (),
which is positive and significant in the attrition models, and
negative in the reenlistment models.
7. Fixed effects estimates
In contrast to bivariate probit, fixed effects estimation
does not depend on an outside source of variation to predict
participation, but rather assumes that non-JROTC recruits
from the same zip code are more appropriate controls than
the average recruit in the sample. This would be true if
recruits who  lived in the same zip code are influenced
by the same socioeconomic conditions when making their
decisions on JROTC enrollment and on military enlistment,
separation, and reenlistment.
Fixed effects logit estimates are presented in Table 4
(odds-ratios appear in brackets). JROTC graduates are
17–23% less likely to leave during the 4-year contract,
with the smaller effects occurring later during the first
term of service. The fixed effects estimates are smaller
than the bivariate probit estimates, but are still consis-
tent with negative selection of JROTC participants. With
respect to long-term job stability, JROTC graduates are 22%
more likely to reenlist than other recruits from the same
zip code, which exceeds both the univariate and bivariate
probit estimates.
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Table 3
Bivariate probit estimates of JROTC effects on turnover and reenlistment.
All  Males  Females 
Job match
12-Month turnover −0.517 0.18 −0.473 0.16 −0.505 0.18
(0.137)*** (0.06)*** (0.161)*** (0.07)** (0.256)** (0.12)
[−0.117] [−0.108] [−0.119]
24-Month turnover −0.464 0.15 −0.291 0.08 −0.631 0.24
(0.128)*** (0.06)*** (0.154)* (0.07) (0.230)*** (0.11)**
[−0.134] [−0.089] [−0.174]
36-Month turnover −0.489 0.18 −0.381 0.13 −0.542 0.21
(0.123)*** (0.06)*** (0.141)*** (0.06)** (0.237)** (0.11)*
[−0.157] [−0.126] [−0.175]
First term turnover −0.507 0.18 −0.423 0.15 −0.465 0.17
(0.121)*** (0.05)*** (0.142)*** (0.06)** (0.239)* (0.11)
[−0.174] [−0.148] [−0.164]
Observations 253,815 209,548 44,267
Job  stability
Reenlistment 0.228 −0.04 0.203 −0.03 0.023 0.05
(sample: 36 month stayers) (0.107)** (0.05) (0.123)* (0.06) (0.199) (0.10)
[0.086] [0.076] [0.009]
Observations 161,925 134,182 27,743
Notes: All regressions include demographics (gender, race, marital status, number of children), AFQT scores, education, and cohort dummies. Reenlistment
models also include dummies for military specialties (10 categories). Additionally, all regressions include the following county-level variables: unemploy-
ment  rates and per-capita income (in log form) for each year from 1990 to 2007; the county population serving in the Armed Forces (in log form) based on
the  1990 and 2000 Census; the population living below poverty level (in log form) from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, and the percent of the population
black,  Hispanic, and American Indian from the 2000 Census. The instrument for JROTC is an indicator for whether any high school in the recruit’s zip
code  offered JROTC. The zip code was missing or erroneous for 20% of the original sample; these recruits were excluded from the sample used in these
regressions. About 41,176 recruits in our sample (16%) lived in a zip code that contained a JROTC high school. In the first stage regressions predicting
JROTC participation, ZIPJROTC has an estimated coefficient of 0.143 (s.e. = 0.039) when using the sample for the attrition models, and a coefficient of 0.175
(s.e.  = 0.043) for the restricted sample of stayers used in the reenlistment and promotion models.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to within-county correlation. Marginal effects appear in brackets.* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
The JROTC turnover effect is substantially larger for
women than for men  in the bivariate probit and fixed
effects estimates. The positive impact of JROTC on reen-
listment is confined to males in the bivariate probit results,
but is observed for both men  and women in the fixed effects
results.
Table 4
Fixed effects logit estimates of turnover and reenlistment.
All 
Job match
12-Month turnover −0.260 2
(0.033)***
[0.771] 
24-Month turnover −0.230 2
(0.029)***
[0.795] 
36-Month turnover −0.185 2
(0.027)***
[0.831] 





(sample: 36 month stayers) (0.032)***
[1.228] 
Notes: All regressions include demographics (gender, race, marital status, number
models also include dummies for military specialties (10 categories). The averag
and  a maximum of 846. Standard errors are in parentheses; odds-ratios in bracke
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.Fixed effects estimation deals with the bias induced
from unobserved attributes of the localities where JROTC
recruits lived, which may  affect decisions to join JROTC and
to pursue military careers. Fixed effects methods recover
the treatment effect for the typical JROTC recruit (the
average treatment effect on the treated, or ATT), whereas
















 of children), AFQT scores, education, and cohort dummies. Reenlistment
e number of individuals in the same zip code is 60, with a minimum of 2
ts.
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Table 5A
Estimates of the effect of JROTC on promotion outcomes.
Panel A. Panel B. Panel C.
Probit Bivariate probit Fixed effects logit
All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females
Promotion to Rank E4 −0.053 −0.055 −0.032 −0.335 −0.373 −0.083 −0.084 −0.064 −0.127
(0.020)*** (0.023)** (0.043) (0.143)** (0.152)** (0.466) (0.041)** (0.047) (0.090)
[−0.015] [−0.016] [−0.010] [−0.107] [−0.119] [−0.026] [0.919] [0.938] [0.881]
Promotion to Rank E4 −0.214 −0.225 −0.177 −0.370 −0.487 0.014 −0.194 −0.236 −0.397
(controlling for entry rank) (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.047)*** (0.147)** (0.142)*** (0.412) (0.045)*** (0.054)*** (0.099)***
[−0.060] [−0.062] [−0.055] [−0.110] [−0.148] [0.004] [0.824] [0.790] [0.672]
Promotion to Rank E5 0.021 0.018 −0.012 −0.137 −0.305 0.315 0.041 0.014 −0.0001
(0.022) (0.024) (0.052) (0.133) (0.128)** (0.346) (0.046) (0.051) (0.119)
[0.003] [0.003] [−0.001] [−0.020] [−0.044] [0.038] [1.042] [1.014] [1.000]
Promotion to Rank E5 −0.218 −0.220 −0.223 −0.483 −0.614 −0.049 −0.341 −0.367 −0.367
(controlling for entry rank) (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.054)*** (0.230)** (0.237)*** (0.488) (0.047)*** (0.052)*** (0.123)***
[−0.030] [−0.033] [−0.018] [−0.055] [−0.071] [0.004] [0.711] [0.693] [0.693]
Observations 192,657 159,891 32,766 150,068 124,347 25,721 148,342 122,265 22,956
Notes: All regressions include demographics (gender, race, marital status, number of children), AFQT scores, education, cohort dummies, and dummies for
military  specialties (10 categories). The promotion samples include only individuals present in all four years, for which we can observe the pay-grade level
in  each time period.





































Ordered probit estimates of grade at the end of 4 years.
All Males Females
JROTC −0.011 −0.015 −0.023
(0.016) (0.018) (0.035)
Observations 192,564 159,815 32,749
Notes: All regressions include demographics (gender, race, marital status,
number of children), AFQT scores, education, cohort dummies, and dum-
mies for military specialties (10 categories).
Standard errors are in parentheses.
four years, so that career progression throughout the first
term can be observed. Promotion results are presented in
Tables 5A and 5B.
21 It should be noted that our promotion indicators (promote to E4; pro-
mote to E5) measure whether the recruit reached a certain milestone by
the end of the first term. Since all recruits have the opportunity to advance
to  these grades in the first term, regardless of entry level, these indicators* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
ivariate probit models identify the local average treat-
ent effect (LATE) from recruits who join JROTC because
ocal schools offer the program. The difference in the
stimates suggests that students who participate in the
rogram because it is offered in the local high school have
etter job match quality than the typical JROTC student.
ixed effects turnover estimates also may  be smaller (than
ivariate probit estimates) because they do not control for
he potentially stronger military tastes of JROTC gradu-
tes. However, instrumenting individual participation with
chool offerings accounts for the possibility that JROTC
ecruits have stronger military propensity, since placement
f JROTC units is not affected by an individual’s preferences.
Both the ATT and the LATE estimates are important for
valuating overall program effects. The average participant
ppears to have a more stable career and better job match
han the average non-participant; however, these effects
re even stronger for marginal participants who would not
ave joined this program, had it not been for its availability
t the school.
A supplementary analysis of official military separa-
ion codes for early leavers provides additional support
or the claim that JROTC participants have more stable
areers due to better job matches. Table A2 analyzes group
ifferences in military separation codes. The first column
epresents the difference in sample means of 22 separa-
ion codes between the two groups, while the second and
hird columns condition these differences on demograph-
cs and education, respectively. The results show that JROTC
ecruits are significantly less likely to leave for reasons sug-
esting poor job matches, such as displaying behavioral
roblems, enlisting by lying on the application (fraudulent
ntry), transferring to a different military branch, or being
ischarged for drug or alcohol use. Also, they are less likely
o be released early due to downsizing, which suggests they
isplay better job performance than others. Finally, JROTC
ecruits are more likely to transfer from the enlisted ranks* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
to an officer commissioning program, which indicates a
stronger propensity for military careers.
8. Career progression
To investigate productivity effects, we  analyze pro-
motion to grades E4 and E5 during the first term of
service. Because JROTC participants enter the military
in advanced pay grades we estimate promotion mod-
els with and without conditioning on entry grade.21 The
promotion samples include individuals who survive fordo not favor JROTC recruits who enter in higher pay grades. Entering in
an  advanced pay grade may  help reach these goals faster, but we are not
concerned with the timing of promotion. Conditioning on entry pay grade
aims to take into account any advantages that JROTC recruits may  have in
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Table 6
The effects of Navy-JROTC on turnover, reenlistment, and promotion.
Probit Bivariate probit Fixed effects logit
All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females
Panel A. Job match
12-Month turnover −0.120 −0.153 0.006 −0.859 −1.101 −0.145 −0.073 −0.147 0.039
(0.034)*** (0.039)*** (0.074) (0.264)*** (0.280)*** (0.684) (0.093) (0.107) (0.257)
[−0.029]  [−0.037] [0.001] [−0.194] [−0.250] [−0.032] [0.930] [0.863] [1.039]
24-Month turnover −0.111 −0.142 0.006 −0.943 −1.060 −1.471 −0.096 −0.174 0.009
(0.032)*** (0.036)*** (0.069) (0.294)*** (0.288)*** (0.051)*** (0.082) (0.094)* (0.225)
[−0.034]  [−0.043] [0.002] [−0.264] [−0.300] [−0.395] [0.909] [0.840] [1.009]
36-month turnover −0.120 −0.134 −0.069 −0.922 −1.033 −1.238 −0.091 −0.146 −0.063
(0.030)*** (0.034)*** (0.066) (0.253)*** (0.265)*** (0.519)** (0.076) (0.087)* (0.218)
[−0.042]  [−0.046] [−0.024] [−0.292] [−0.326] [−0.364] [0.913] [0.864] [0.939]
First  term turnover −0.097 −0.110 −0.050 −0.911 −1.035 −1.241 −0.031 −0.104 0.109
(0.030)*** (0.033)*** (0.065) (0.245)*** (0.279)*** (0.908) (0.073) (0.083) (0.204)
[−0.035]  [−0.040] [−0.018] [−0.308] [−0.347] [−0.393] [0.970] [0.901] [1.116]
Observations 9347 7310 2037 7460 5840 1620 6400 4796 1048
Panel  B. Job stability
Reenlistment 0.044 0.081 −0.067 −0.010 −0.081 1.409 0.047 0.132 −0.015
(0.036)  (0.040)** (0.079) (0.386) (0.446) (0.055)*** (0.095) (0.112) (0.276)
[0.016]  [0.030] [−0.025] [−0.004] [−.030] [0.442] [1.048] [1.141] [0.985]
Observations 6276 4894 1382 5039 3925 1114 4049 2965 647
Panel  C. Promotion
To E4 0.064 0.058 0.102 0.191 0.503 1.003 0.160 0.116 0.408
(0.043)  (0.049) (0.097) (0.370) (0.520) (1.412) (0.123) (0.147) (0.350)
[0.016]  [0.015] [0.030] [0.049] [−0.121] [0.167] [1.174] [1.123] [1.504]
To  E4 0.100 0.102 0.122 0.266 0.497 1.144 0.173 0.120 0.547
(controlling for entry grade) (0.047)** (0.054)* (0.102) (0.465) (0.497) (0.758) (0.137) (0.170) (0.389)
[0.024]  [0.023] [0.034] [0.062] [−0.108] [0.202] [1.189] [1.127] [1.727]
To  E5 0.104 0.148 −0.146 0.465 0.868 −0.414 0.285 0.411 −0.511
(0.047)** (0.051)*** (0.121) (0.446) (0.428)** (0.640) (0.139)** (0.158)*** (0.591)
[0.017]  [0.034] [−0.020] [0.084] [0.118] [−0.005] [1.330] [1.509] [0.600]
To  E5 0.092 0.141 −0.173 0.342 0.865 −0.672 0.277 0.400 −1.157
(controlling for entry grade) (0.047)* (0.052)*** (0.124) (0.433) (0.398)** (0.479) (0.140)** (0.160)** (0.716)
[0.015]  [0.031] [−0.021] [0.057] [0.114] [−0.006] [1.320] [1.492] [0.314]
Observations 5904 4619 1212 4745 3696 1049 3292 2341 544
See notes to Tables 2–4 for model specifications. The sample is restricted to JROTC recruits and the control group contains non-Navy JROTC recruits. For the bivariate probit regressions, the instrument used is
“any  Navy-JROTC unit in zip code”. In all first stage regressions, this variable is highly significant. Standard errors are in parentheses. For probit and bivariate probit, marginal effects appear in brackets. For fixed
effects  estimates, odds ratios are in brackets.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.





















nFig. 1. The distribution of JROTC and non-JR
In Panel A of Table 5A,  the probit estimates indicate that
ROTC recruits are slightly less likely to achieve E4, and
hat the effect is larger when entry grade is held constant.
ROTC recruits are just as likely to attain E5 as their peers,
xcept when they are compared to recruits who enter in
dvanced grades. In Panels B and C, the bivariate probit
nd fixed effects results tend to confirm the probit results,
lthough program effects are somewhat smaller. It appears
hat, although JROTC recruits enter in higher grades, other
ecruits overtake them by the end of the first term. To pro-
ide further evidence on promotion outcomes, Table 5B
isplays results from an ordered probit model of grade level
t the end of four years. The results indicate that the grade
istribution at the end of the first term is no different sta-
istically between JROTC and other recruits. Similarly, Fig. 1
ompares the progression of JROTC recruits and non-JROTC
ecruits and confirms that the positions of the two  groups in
he hierarchy converge at the end of four years of service.22
22 One potential explanation for the absence of a promotion effect is that
ilitary promotion rules include a time-in-service requirement. The time-
n-service requirement for promotion to E4 is 2 years, which means that
ew hires entering in grade E1 can overtake those who  enter in grade E3uits across grades during 4 years of service.
So far, the overall results suggest that vocational train-
ing primarily affects job-related outcomes by increasing
job match quality rather than by enhancing human capi-
tal. In the military, wages are rigidly tied to grades, so our
promotion results imply minimal wage differences dur-
ing the first term. These findings may  help explain why
some prior studies find positive long-run wage effects of
vocational education, but no such effects in the short run.
If vocational education works by improving occupational
selection, rather than by increasing occupation-specific
human capital, wage differences in the short run may be
negligible, only to become apparent later in the life cycle,
as vocational graduates accumulate more occupation- or
firm-specific human capital.9. Specificity of vocational training
The evidence above supports the hypothesis that voca-
tional education mainly improves job match quality. An
within 2 years. However, we focus on the probability of attaining a given
rank by the end of the 4-year contract, rather than speed of promotion,
which could be spuriously affected by entering at an advanced grade.
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alternative hypothesis, discussed earlier, is that vocational
education imparts occupation-specific skills but only for
those whose occupation matches their vocational training
(human capital effect). Our data allows us to distinguish
between these two hypotheses.
JROTC offers a continuum of skill specificity ranging
from general military knowledge to branch-specific skills.
Each high school JROTC program is operated by one mil-
itary branch and includes both general military courses
as well as classes relevant solely to that branch. There-
fore, in this section we  separate JROTC recruits into those
who complete Navy JROTC (NJROTC) versus those who
complete a non-Navy, other JROTC program (OJROTC). By
comparing the job performance of these two groups, we can
shed light on whether the problem with finding positive
returns to vocational education hinges on the definition of
a training–occupation match. If JROTC mainly performs a
sorting function by helping students discover whether they
are well-matched with the military, the returns to JROTC
should be the same regardless of curriculum. Alternatively,
if the Navy-specific knowledge acquired in NJROTC is rel-
evant solely to job performance in the Navy, then career
outcomes for NJROTC recruits should be superior to other
JROTC graduates.
This comparison should also reveal whether our previ-
ous estimates of the returns to JROTC are truly causal. For
this analysis we include only JROTC recruits in the sample.
Since students who participate in JROTC do so for simi-
lar reasons, and since they all enter at the same grade,
comparing NJROTC to OJROTC allows us to hold constant
institutional features and any further selection into the pro-
gram that may  confound our estimates. Results appear in
Table 6.
Our probit results confirm that NJROTC recruits have
lower turnover than OJROTC recruits. This result is driven
largely by males in the sample, since turnover among
women does not vary by curriculum. In our bivariate probit
estimates, we use an instrument based on the presence of a
school in the zip code that specifically offered NJROTC. This
variable should be correlated with participation in NJROTC,
but should not be correlated with performance. Based on
this model, NJROTC reduces turnover for both men  and
women (for the latter only in some specifications), and
increases retention for women. In contrast, fixed effects
estimates indicate only a small turnover advantage among
NJROTC men.
With respect to promotion, the promotion results indi-
cate that, among men, NJROTC recruits have higher E5
promotion rates than OJROTC recruits. This result confirms
the hypothesis that job performance is enhanced more
by specific occupational training than by general voca-
tional training. This evidence also suggests that returns
to vocational education may  hinge on the definition of
the training–occupation match. Indeed, prior studies that
use more detailed occupational categories do find posi-
tive returns to vocational education (Neuman & Ziderman,
1999), whereas those that use broad occupational cate-
gories (Hotchkiss, 1993) find no effects.ion Review 31 (2012) 680– 693
10. Conclusions
This study contributes to the debate on the benefits
of high school vocational education by investigating the
channels via which such programs influence careers. We
address the following questions: Does vocational educa-
tion directly enhance occupation-specific human capital or
does it provide ex ante job information that helps trainees
sort into occupations? Do more specific occupational skills
impart additional benefits above and beyond those of gen-
eral vocational training? Are vocational training effects
homogeneous across male and female participants? While
the literature focuses on wages as an indicator of labor mar-
ket success, we  investigate the effect of vocational training
on early job turnover, job stability, and promotion in an
internal labor market.
Using a rich data set of Navy recruits who received mil-
itary science training via high school JROTC, we  find that
vocational education reduces early turnover and increases
long-term job attachment. These effects are increasing in
the specificity of the vocational skills, since graduates of
Navy-JROTC programs have better job match quality than
recruits from non-Navy programs. Women  appear to ben-
efit more from general information on military careers
rather than from Navy-specific training. Also, the bene-
fits of the vocational training are more pronounced for
marginal participants (those who  undertake such training
because it is available at the high school), rather than the
typical student who participates in JROTC.
Overall, the results suggest that one important effect
of vocational training is to improve job match qual-
ity. Interestingly, vocational training also appears to
improve job productivity, measured by promotion, only
when we employ a narrower specification of the
training–occupation match. This evidence helps recon-
cile the seemingly contradictory findings in prior studies.
In particular, general vocational education may  increase
life-time earnings by improving job match quality and
thereby fostering long-term employment relationships.
Occupation-specific training also can have a positive
human capital effect, subject to the researcher’s ability
to identify the occupation–training match in sufficient
detail.
One benefit of lower turnover is to increase the orga-
nization’s incentives to invest in further firm-specific
training. Firms with less rigid internal policies than the
military may  offer more firm-specific training to voca-
tional graduates than to other new hires, which would
further contribute to long-term earnings growth of voca-
tional graduates. Future research should investigate the
extent and type of on-the-job training offered by employ-
ers as an additional channel via which vocational training
may  affect labor market success.Appendix A.
Tables A1 and A2
E. Pema, S. Mehay / Economics of Education Review 31 (2012) 680– 693 691
Table A1
Full probit results of JROTC effects on turnover and reenlistment.
12-Month turnover 24-Month turnover 36-Month turnover First term turnover Reenlistment
JROTC −0.132 −0.116 −0.088 −0.094 0.144
(0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.017)***
[−0.035] [−0.038] [−0.031] [−0.035] [0.055]
Female 0.066 0.053 0.064 0.073 −0.067
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.024] [0.028] [−0.026]
African American −0.175 −0.140 −0.110 −0.114 0.295
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)***
[−0.047] [−0.046] [−0.039] [−0.043] 0.111
Hispanic −0.260 −0.269 −0.266 −0.257 0.093
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)***
[−0.067] [−0.085] [−0.092] [−0.095] 0.036
Native  American 0.032 0.043 0.048 0.043 0.030
(0.015)** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.018)
[0.009]  [0.015] [0.018] [0.016] [0.012]
Asian  −0.430 −0.475 −0.483 −0.490 0.325
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
[−0.101] [−0.137] [−0.156] [−0.169] [0.120]
Other  race −0.180 −0.173 −0.164 −0.180 0.101
(0.028)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.030)***
[−0.047] [−0.055] [−0.058] [−0.067] [0.039]
Single  with children 0.215 0.208 0.195 0.181 0.155
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.015)***
[0.066] [0.073] [0.074] [0.071] [0.059]
Married, no children 0.197 0.110 0.049 0.047 0.033
(0.069)*** (0.067)* (0.066) (0.065) (0.084)
[0.060]  [0.038] [0.018] [0.018] [0.013]
Married with children 0.135 0.091 0.063 0.049 0.246
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)***
[0.040] [0.031] [0.023] [0.019] [0.092]
AFQT  −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 0.005
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
[−0.002] [−0.002] [−0.002] [−0.002] [0.002]
No  high school diploma 0.437 0.497 0.513 0.494 −0.042
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.017)**
[0.143] [0.185] [0.199] [0.195] [−0.016]
GED  0.369 0.426 0.451 0.440 −0.048
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)***
[0.117] [0.156] [0.174] [0.173] [−0.019]
Some  college 0.230 0.262 0.282 0.266 −0.013
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.018)
[0.071]  [0.094] [0.107] [0.104] [−0.005]
College 0.056 0.146 0.164 0.159 −0.121
(0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.022)***
[0.016] [0.051] [0.062] [0.062] [−0.047]
Observations 325,560 325,560 325,560 325,560 207,825
Notes: Results obtained via probit. All regressions also include cohort dummies and ten occupational categories. Standard errors are in parentheses and
marginal effects are in brackets.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
Table A2
Differences in separation codes.
Official separation code JROTC vs. non-JROTC recuits




Desertion 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Drugs −0.013*** −0.014*** −0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Character or behavior disorder −0.004** −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Discreditable incidents, civilian or military 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Substandard performance of duty 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table A2 (Continued )
Official separation code JROTC vs. non-JROTC recuits




Commission of a serious offense 0.003* 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Expiration of term of service (involuntary discharge) 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraudulent entry, or erroneous enlistment −0.016*** −0.017*** −0.016***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Parenthood 0.002** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Disability −0.0001 −0.001 −0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unqualified for active duty 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Failure to adapt to military 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Failure to meet minimum retention requirements 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Alcoholism −0.002** −0.001* −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Expiration of term of service (voluntary discharge) 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Early or voluntary release, to attend school −0.004*** −0.003*** −0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dependency or hardship 0.0001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Discharge in lieu of court-martial −0.002 −0.002* −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Entry into officer commissioning program 0.001 0.002** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Involuntary transfer to another service upon completion of duty 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Voluntary transfer to another service upon completion of duty −0.024*** −0.014*** −0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Early release due to downsizing, decommissioning, etc. −0.004*** −0.003*** −0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Note: All results obtained via linear probability models with robust errors (in parentheses).
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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